

3.4 Review of the decision to prosecute

Document Path: [Criminal Procedure - A to Z of New Zealand Law : Chapter 3 - From initiation of proceedings to first appearance](#)

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Last Reviewed: 04/07/2014

Classification: [Administrative law](#), [Criminal procedure](#)

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3.4 Review of the decision to prosecute

Courts are reluctant to exercise the power to review a decision to prosecute, and partly it reflects a desire to provide a fair trial,^[21] and partly it reflects a desire to ensure that the Commission did not recommend a change in the law. The Commission did not recommend a change in the law, and that review is not used as a routine tactic, and that review is not used as a routine tactic. ^[23]

The Crown Law Prosecution Guidelines ^[24] require the Commission to provide a reasonable prospect of conviction) and a public interest test. Similar guidelines are used in many common law jurisdictions. The Commission can create immunity or defence, and it is not the role of the Commission to create immunity or defence, and it is not the role of the Commission to create immunity or defence.

Review of the decision to prosecute is a highly exceptional power, and is only used where some other exceptional circumstance justifies it.

²⁰ *Hallett v Attorney-General* [1989] 2 NZLR 8 (CA). See also *Law — Procedure* (online looseleaf ed, Brookers).

17.4 A tort of invasion of privacy by publicity given to private facts

Document Path: [The Law of Torts in New Zealand, Todd \(ed\) : Chapter 17 - Invasion of Privacy](#)

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Last Reviewed: 01/01/2013

Classification: [Bill of Rights > Inconsistency](#), [Media law > Broadcasting > Standards > Privacy](#), [Privacy > Competing rights > Public interest](#)

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17.4.01 Introduction

For almost 20 years the New Zealand High Court contemplated a tort of invasion of privacy. In *Tucker v News Media Ownership Ltd*^[52] in 1985, McGechan J said that he supported the introduction into the New Zealand common law of "a tort covering invasion of personal privacy at least by public disclosure of private facts". That dictum was cited in later cases where judges used the possible existence of this tort as a ground for granting an interim injunction.^[53] Detailed consideration was devoted to the question by Gallen J in *Bradley v Wingnut Films Ltd*^[54] in 1993, his Honour saying he was prepared to accept the existence of such a tort; the facts of the case, however, fell some way short of constituting an actionable breach. The most significant of the High Court cases was *P v D*^[55] in 2000. A high-profile professional person was granted an injunction to prevent publication of the fact that he or she had been receiving psychiatric treatment. Nicholson J defined the constituent elements of the tort in a way which was to be substantially approved by the Court of Appeal four years later: (1) public disclosure (2) of private as opposed to public facts, (3) those facts being highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, (4) the nature and extent of legitimate public interest in the disclosure being also taken into account. In 2002 a District Court, applying *P v D*, awarded damages for breach of privacy.^[56]

The stage was thus set for the Court of Appeal to make an authoritative determination of whether or not the tort exists in New Zealand. The Court decided, in *Hosking v Runting*,^[57] that the course charted by the High Court was correct, and that the clock should not be turned back.

17.4.02 *Hosking v Runting*: a new tort

Mike Hosking was a television presenter. He and his wife had separated. A photographer took photographs of Mrs Hosking walking down a public street with the Hoskings' twin baby daughters in a pushchair. The Hoskings sued for an injunction to stop publication of these photographs in a magazine. They relied on invasion of privacy. The Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that the Hoskings must fail on the facts. The photographs were taken in a public place; they created no risk to the children; they disclosed no further facts about the children, nor about the family circumstances, that were not already in the public domain; and no reasonable person could treat publication of them as highly offensive or objectionable.